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[Low impact] The PR adds an audit document for maintainers. This documentation-only PR is safe to merge, but the report should be corrected before anyone uses it to plan security fixes. Findings
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| ### 1. [CRITICAL] `db-conn-mongodb` — MongoDB Connection URI with Plaintext Password | ||
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| - **Category:** `secret` | ||
| - **Location:** `packages/pam/handlers/mongodb/proxy.go:92` | ||
| - **Details:** Potential hardcoded credential or secret detected in `packages/pam/handlers/mongodb/proxy.go:92` (rule `db-conn-mongodb`). Raw value redacted (`***REDACTED***`) for safe disclosure. | ||
| - **Recommended Fix:** Revoke leaked credential immediately and rotate in secret manager. |
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Examples mistaken for leaked secrets
The critical finding points to an example comment containing user:pass, not a leaked login. Other credential entries flag public labels such as purposePassword = "password" and the environment-variable name INFISICAL_LDAP_PASSWORD.
Remove these false positives and update the totals. Otherwise, maintainers are told to rotate nonexistent secrets or replace required labels.
Note: If this suggestion doesn't match your team's coding style, reply to this and let me know. I'll remember it for next time!
| ### 9. [HIGH] `go-cmdi-exec-combined` — go-cmdi-exec-combined: Command Execution via Dynamic exec.Command | ||
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| - **Category:** `sast` | ||
| - **Location:** `packages/cmd/run.go:228` | ||
| - **Details:** Go application security vulnerability or insecure coding pattern. at packages/cmd/run.go:228 | ||
| - **Recommended Fix:** Invoke the target binary directly with exec.Command(bin, args...) without sh -c shell evaluation. |
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Command advice is already implemented
The command findings recommend a change already present at the cited calls. packages/cmd/run.go:228 passes the command and its arguments separately to exec.Command. The test helper, sandbox probe, and login renewal do the same. The Azure call intentionally opens an interactive shell.
Identify a concrete unsafe input path or mark these entries as unverified. The blanket advice to remove shell-string execution does not address the listed code and gives maintainers tasks whose proposed fix is already in place.
| - **Location:** `dev/pam/resources/mssql/Dockerfile:6` | ||
| - **Details:** Container executes processes as root user by default because no non-root USER instruction was specified. | ||
| - **Recommended Fix:** Add 'USER 10001' or a dedicated non-root application user. |
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Container already runs without root
The SQL Server image already ends with USER mssql. Its earlier USER root only permits the build to change the entrypoint's permissions. The claim that no non-root user is specified is false.
Remove this finding rather than recommend another user change. It sends maintainers toward an unnecessary change to a container already configured to run without root.
Note: If this suggestion doesn't match your team's coding style, reply to this and let me know. I'll remember it for next time!
| - **Category:** `misconfiguration` | ||
| - **Location:** `dev/pam/resources/ssh-server/Dockerfile:1` | ||
| - **Details:** Container does not specify a non-root USER, allowing processes to execute with root privileges. | ||
| - **Recommended Fix:** Add 'USER <non-root-uid>' instruction before container entrypoint. |
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Advice breaks SSH development servers
These recommendations ignore that this is a dedicated SSH development server. Its entrypoint creates users, sets passwords, and edits SSH settings. Simply adding a non-root USER would make setup fail. The next recommendation to remove the OpenSSH daemon would remove the service being tested.
Explain the fixture's purpose and setup needs instead of prescribing changes that would break the local PAM development servers.
Note: If this suggestion doesn't match your team's coding style, reply to this and let me know. I'll remember it for next time!
| - **Location:** `packages/gateway-v2/certscan/pkcs12_legacy_pbe.go:97` | ||
| - **Details:** Using broken cryptographic algorithms (DES, 3DES, RC4, Blowfish, AES-ECB mode) compromises data confidentiality. at packages/gateway-v2/certscan/pkcs12_legacy_pbe.go:97 | ||
| - **Recommended Fix:** Use AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 for symmetric encryption. Avoid ECB mode. |
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Cipher advice breaks legacy reads
The cited cipher decrypts existing PKCS12 files; it does not choose how new files are encrypted. The file declares which algorithm must be used. Replacing that algorithm with AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 would make supported legacy files unreadable.
Scope stronger-encryption advice to how files are created, and preserve the legacy read support required by the existing tests.
| ### 18. [HIGH] `native-rust-raw-pointer-deref` — native-rust-raw-pointer-deref: Raw Pointer Dereference in Rust | ||
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| - **Category:** `sast` | ||
| - **Location:** `packages/pam/handlers/rdp/native/src/ffi.rs:60` | ||
| - **Details:** Native systems programming security flaw. at packages/pam/handlers/rdp/native/src/ffi.rs:60 | ||
| - **Recommended Fix:** Prefer safe Rust abstractions and checked conversions (TryFrom/TryInto) over unsafe blocks, raw pointer dereferences, or mem::transmute. |
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Required Rust code called vulnerable
The Rust entries classify required interface code as high-severity flaws without identifying a bad read or write. For example, ffi.rs:60 declares a pointer field; it does not dereference it. The #[no_mangle] exports also provide the exact names called by Go.
Show a specific broken caller rule or invalid access, or label these entries as unverified review points. As written, dozens of security tasks do not identify what is broken or what change would fix it.
🛡️ Automated Security Audit — BlackShield Pipeline Scanner
Hi
@Infisicalteam 👋We ran the open BlackShield Pipeline Scanner in an isolated, read-only, network-airgapped sandbox against
Infisical/cli(commit6368c5e) and identified 63 actionable security finding(s) (1 Critical,62 High).📊 Findings Summary by Severity
🔍 Top Actionable Findings
secretdb-conn-mongodbpackages/pam/handlers/mongodb/proxy.go:92misconfigurationCKV_DOCKER_1dev/pam/resources/mssql/Dockerfile:6misconfigurationCKV_DOCKER_1dev/pam/resources/ssh-server/Dockerfile:1misconfigurationCKV_DOCKER_6dev/pam/resources/ssh-server/Dockerfile:8sastgo-cmdi-exec-combinede2e/util/helpers.go:475misconfigurationCKV_DOCKER_1goreleaser.dockerfile:1sastsec-hardcoded-credentialspackages/agentproxy/rewrite.go:16sastsec-hardcoded-credentialspackages/agentproxy/rewrite.go:12sastgo-cmdi-exec-combinedpackages/cmd/run.go:228sastsec-broken-crypto-cipherpackages/gateway-v2/certscan/pkcs12_legacy_pbe.go:97sastnative-rust-no-manglepackages/pam/handlers/rdp/native/src/ffi.rs:274sastnative-rust-no-manglepackages/pam/handlers/rdp/native/src/ffi.rs:333sastnative-rust-no-manglepackages/pam/handlers/rdp/native/src/ffi.rs:388sastnative-rust-no-manglepackages/pam/handlers/rdp/native/src/ffi.rs:434sastnative-rust-no-manglepackages/pam/handlers/rdp/native/src/ffi.rs:465…plus 48 additional finding(s) documented in
.security/blackshield-audit-report.md.📦 What's Included in This PR
.security/blackshield-audit-report.md— Detailed remediation guide with file paths, line numbers, CVE fixed versions, and CWE references..github/workflows/blackshield-security.yml— Drop-in, zero-cost GitHub Actions workflow that runsblackshield/pipeline-scanneron every future Pull Request with least-privilege permissions (contents: read).🚀 Want Continuous Protection or Centralized Triage?
.github/workflows/blackshield-security.yml(snippet below) to run the open scanner in your own GitHub Actions runner on every PR at zero cost.📋 Drop-in GitHub Actions Workflow (
.github/workflows/blackshield-security.yml)Generated autonomously inside a network-isolated (
--network=none), read-only BlackShield sandbox (https://blackshield.chaplau.com). All potential secret values have been automatically redacted (***REDACTED***).