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69 changes: 35 additions & 34 deletions ROADMAP.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -149,29 +149,28 @@ APIs, provider routes, network locations, or credentials.

The dependency order for this work is strict:

A. review the canonical v1 source-only contract and operational contract
surface, including the exact EVM `has_access_by_content_id`
policy/evidence contract, recipient-key authorization, immutable custody
epochs, and the authenticated replay-pending Runtime-to-release-node
envelope;
B. build source-only custody-node operations and durable node state on top of
that contract. The published custody branch covers the node-local durable
dual-key claim, claim-gated release, exact encrypted-result persistence, and
exact retry replay. Remaining work is issuer lifecycle, node admission,
rotation, recovery, operational review, and recovery from a durable claim
that has no durable result;
C. replace the provisional DTO/provider surface atomically and wire
Runtime/Wallet/provider integration to the reviewed contract, with one
source allow flow and one source deny flow; and
D. prove the installed end-to-end open/decrypt/render path.

The published source-only stack currently ends at
`origin/feat/protected-content-key-reconstruction` (`a8d0a9a6`). The local
custody-pool work is unpublished policy-contract source only. PR #15 /
`feat/dkms-esp-port` is research evidence for threshold crypto, node-local
custody, lifecycle scenarios, and UX shape; its public `shares[]` metadata,
raw-CEK/reference operations, old DRM orchestration, direct TCP/IP topology,
and standalone harness must not become the product path.
A. define and review the canonical source contracts and custody crypto
boundary;
B. define source-only provider protocols and custody-node state without making
them active product paths;
C. add Wallet-rights, typed Chain evidence, and Runtime-owned durable
coordination as source-only prerequisites;
D. implement inactive Runtime provider lifecycle, registration, routing, and
durable reconciliation before or with a typed rights-provider adapter;
E. implement producer minting, three-node custody provisioning, recipient
possession, private decrypt output, and a full inactive end-to-end proof; and
F. only then atomically replace the provisional DTO/provider surface and prove
the installed mint -> buy -> open -> play path.

The published protected-content review line now reaches
`origin/feat/protected-content-custody-provider` (`f7cd6c3d`), which is still
source-only and unregistered. Local descendants add Wallet-rights, a private
Runtime coordinator, typed Chain evidence, and a typed rights evaluator; those
remain unpublished source work. PR #15 / `feat/dkms-esp-port` is research
evidence for threshold crypto, node-local custody, lifecycle scenarios, and UX
shape; its public `shares[]` metadata, raw-CEK/reference operations, old DRM
orchestration, direct TCP/IP topology, and standalone harness must not become
the product path.

Carrier remains transport only throughout that sequence. It carries
Runtime-selected traffic, but it does not define rights authority, custody
Expand All @@ -182,17 +181,19 @@ algorithm metadata, provenance, availability receipts, declared viewer
interface, CEK commitment, and object-bound pool/epoch/committee-authorization
identities. Public metadata must not carry custody shares. `CustodyEnvelopeV1`
remains a private ephemeral provisioning bundle; durable custody storage is one
node-sealed share per selected custody node. Cryptographic upgrades use
versioned envelopes and migration rules. A permissioned key service can precede
a public network, but
production claims require independent review and operational evidence.

The repository now has a canonical source-only v1 review candidate in
[Protected-content v1 contracts](docs/PROTECTED_CONTENT_CONTRACTS_V1.md). The
current installed/provider path still uses the older provisional
`elastos_common::protected_content` DTOs plus fail-closed provider stubs, so
see [Protected content](docs/PROTECTED_CONTENT.md) and the provider-specific
contracts as the current integration surface, not as proof that v1 is wired.
node-sealed share per selected custody node. The first product proof must use
three distinct custody provider identities and state roots for a 2-of-3
committee. Cryptographic upgrades use versioned envelopes and migration rules.
A permissioned key service can precede a public network, but production claims
require independent review and operational evidence.

The repository now has a canonical source-only v1 review line in
[Protected-content v1 contracts](docs/PROTECTED_CONTENT_CONTRACTS_V1.md) and
[Protected content](docs/PROTECTED_CONTENT.md). The current installed/provider
path still uses the older provisional `elastos_common::protected_content` DTOs
plus fail-closed provider stubs. The canonical source line is not product proof
until Runtime, providers, Library, Wallet, Chain, custody, decrypt output, and
viewer are connected in one no-fallback path.

### 4. Add wallet, DID, and node proofs behind Runtime authority

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